Run a Google search
for “Brad Lidge mental” or “Brad Lidge + Albert Pujols” and you’ll find a
wealth of websites offering sound amateur psychoanalysis – that Lidge’s
prosperous baseball career was finished after he gave up that ninth-inning
lead-changing three-run home run to Albert Pujols in Game 5 of the 2005 NLCS
(you can watch it here under Oct. 17). Apparently, Lidge was so mentally
wracked after giving up that home run that he no longer could pitch in the high
90’s with his fastball, his slider didn’t have that vicious bite, and he could
no longer locate his pitches properly.
However, nothing
Lidge said or did indicated that this was the case. In fact, in the post-game
interview following Game 5 of the ’05 NLCS (which you can watch here under Oct.
17), Lidge was candid about the Pujols at-bat, taking the blame and crediting
Pujols for the home run, and he said he’d use it as a learning experience. That
doesn’t sound like someone who was going to let a mistake ruin his young
career, does it?
Lidge had an even
worse World Series, as he was responsible for two of the Astros’ four losses.
In Game Two, Lidge allowed a ninth-inning, one-out walk-off home run to Scott
Podsednik, who, simply put, is not a home run hitter. In Game Four, Lidge
allowed two eighth-inning singles: one to Willie Harris, who was bunted over to
second base, and one to Jermaine Dye, who drove in Harris (you can watch both here under Oct. 23 and Oct. 26, respectively). Was this the end for
Brad Lidge?
It’s true that Lidge
did not have a successful season in ’06 following his team’s short-lived
appearance in the ’05 World Series. He pitched 75 innings, put up a 5.28 ERA
(allowed runs in 30 of the 78 games he appeared in, 38%), and a 1.4 WHIP. His
strikeout rate went down slightly and his walk rate ballooned from 2.93 in ’05
to 4.32 in ’06. What was wrong? Nothing in his pitch use shows any reason for
the sudden fallibility of Lidge: his fastball use only increased 2.4%, slider
use decreased 0.9%, he introduced a cutter which accounted for 0.2% of his
pitches, and he used his change-up 0.8% (though that was down 75% from the
previous year’s 2.4%). There was also no meaningful change in the speed of his
pitches. It had to have been mental, right?
The only person who
truly knows is Lidge himself, and, as mentioned, he has never said or done anything
to indicate that he was mentally anguished from his ’05 post-season
performances. Could his lackluster ’06 have been due to overuse? After all, he
pitched 250 and one-third innings between ‘03 and ’05, pitching at least 70+
innings in all three seasons. He threw 1,391, 1,466, and 1,134 pitches in ’03,
’04, and ’05, respectively.
Only two relievers –
Guillermo Mota and Scot Shields – have pitched at least 85 innings in at least
one season between ’03 and ’05, and had a higher total innings pitched combined
in those three seasons than Brad Lidge. Mota pitched 269 innings, Shields 267,
and Lidge 250. A lot of the pitchers who logged at least 200 relief innings
between ’03 and ’05 have since succumbed to injuries, retired (perhaps due to
injuries), or have had a significant drop in production.
If Lidge was
finished, then he wasn’t going to have a successful 2007 season either, and it
seemed like that was the case up until April 22. In those eight games, Lidge
pitched 5 and one-third innings, struck out four, and gave up 6 earned runs on
twelve hits and four walks. Only 55% of his pitches were going for strikes on
top of all that. As a result, he lost his job as the Astros’ closer and was
demoted to the set-up role. In the eighth inning on April 23, 2007 in
Philadelphia against the Phillies, Brad Lidge started off the inning by
allowing a single to Michael Bourn and a ground-rule double to Wes Helms. It
looked like more of the same from Lidge. However, he was urged by catcher Brad
Ausmus to focus on using what made him successful: his fastball and slider.
Lidge followed instructions and struck out the next three hitters he faced –
Aaron Rowand, Rod Barajas, and Jayson Werth – to get out of the inning. Lidge
said of that performance, “it was a small thing, but I can certainly point to
that game and say that was a turning point.”
Including that April
23 performance, Lidge put up a 2.77 ERA the rest of the season, throwing 61 and
two-thirds innings, striking out 84, walking only 23, and holding opposing
batters to a .632 OPS against him. It wasn’t his mentality that hurt him; it
was poor pitch selection and strategy between Ausmus and Lidge.
That success has
followed Lidge into 2008. In ten innings for the Phillies, he’s struck out ten,
walked six and allowed five hits (1.1 WHIP), hasn’t allowed an earned run, and
has converted all five of his save opportunities.
As great as attributing success and failures to the psychology of Major League players, it’s pure conjecture until the players admit to it. Lidge is a perfect example of why psychology is best left to the professionals, and why it means little when it’s in regard to professional athletes of the highest caliber.